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I. Introduction 
Development cooperation policies are not as well known as the European Union's 
other common policies such as the common agricultural policy or common 
commercial policy. Even compared to development policies such as the Lome' 
Convention, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is relatively obscure. The 
concept that the EU has special relations with the non-member Mediterranean 
countries like Algeria and Morocco -and that these relations are of great 
importance -is not commonly understood by European citizens. In the UK, for 
instance, even political scientists widely interpret the phrase 'southern 
Mediterranean' to refer only to the southernmost members of the European Union 
(EU) such as France, Italy or Greece, rather than extending to the developing 
countries bordering on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. This 
anonymity demonstrates one aspect of the EU's failure up to the present to shake 
off the image of 'foreign policy dwarf' (Lister l997).  
Despite the disadvantage of its relative obscurity, the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership offers both shores of the Mediterranean Sea an unprecedented 
opportunity for sustained, mutually beneficial cooperation. The potential 
advantages of the Mediterranean partnership are extensive, including peace, 
stability, economic development, improved governance and communication, 
technical, social, cultural and environmental cooperation. But this article argues 
that such cooperation is not automatic. The advantages of the partnership have 
to be grasped by informed policy-makers and attentive civil society or the current 
level of problems and stagnation of the partnership will make it just one more 
ineffective EU initiative - like the Global Mediterranean Policy of the 1970s or the 
Renovated Mediterranean Policy of the early l990s.  
Pessimistic analyses of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership abound. Barbe' and 
Izquierdo argued that the Euro-Mediterranean had little potential for joint actions, 
demonstrating instead the EU members' lack of unity and lack of political will 
towards the region. The year l995, which featured the Cannes European Council 
meeting in June and the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference in November, 
could indeed be called the 'year of the Mediterranean'(Barbe￿' and Izquierdo, 
l997). But unfortunately the rest of the years in the decade could not. Pinar 
Tank's assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was similarly gloomy. 
He located the underlying basis of the partnership in Europe's desire to stem 
inward migration. Both shores lacked a common purpose, and the relationship 
primarily rested on fear. For Europe, there was the fear of terrorism, weapons 
proliferation and migration from North Africa; whilst the southern partners feared 
Europe's closing its doors to trade and returning migrants (Pinar Tank l998).  
Joffe' agreed that the 'unspoken primary purpose' of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership was to stem migration (Joffe￿' 2000) by fostering economic 
development in the southern countries, from Morocco to Turkey. Moreover, the 
prospect of Nato using force in the Mediterranean basin as it had in Kosovo, or of 
the EU employing its nascent military forces in the region, including the planned 
rapid deployment force, meant this was a partnership the southern countries 
could not easily refuse (Joffe' 2000).  
However, the literature of international relations suggests that a relationship or 
alliance based on fears could be relatively stable (Holsti l995). The EU's ongoing 
problems of political commitment and policy implementation (Nair 2001) discussed below give greater cause for concern. The next section assesses the 
development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the years since its 
inception. The many meanings of 'partnership' in an international context are 
then analysed. Subsequently, the article examines the changing priorities of EU 
development policy, particularly in regard to the Mediterranean basin. The 
following section investigates the problems of EU policy-making, notably the 
tendency to produce more 'hot air' than concrete results. 
The worrying failure in July 2000 of the US-brokered Middle East peace talks at 
Camp David (Macintyre 2000) and subsequent violence in the region further 
highlight the need for a significant EU role in the Mediterranean basin
1.  
II.    The Barcelona Process  
Barcelona Declaration of November l995 set in motion a process designed to 
create a new zone of peace and prosperity around the borders of the 
Mediterranean Sea
2.  
27 signatory polities in a framework of 'comprehensive cooperation and solidarity' 
(Barcelona Declaration l997) in three issue areas: politics and security; 
economics and financial relations; and social, cultural and human affairs 
(including immigration). Among these areas, plans for the second one, including a 
proposed free trade area in industrial goods by 2010, are most developed 
(Aghrout and Alexander l997). 
In June 2000 the European Commission argued that after its first five years the 
Barcelona process was basically correct in its conception and policies, but needed 
'reinvigorating'(European Commission 2000). The Commission refrained from 
criticising the fundamentals of the partnership, based on bilateral association 
agreements, or the EU's political will to implement the partnership and focused 
instead specific areas of difficulty encountered in the first five years of the 
process.  
In particular, the Commission argued, problems of the Middle East peace process 
had held back progress in regional cooperation. The negotiation and ratification of 
the framework bilateral agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean 
partners was too slow . Southern Mediterranean governments had not always 
supported EU perspectives on human rights and civil society. Economic reforms in 
the partner countries to modernise and open their economies needed 
acceleration. Poor disbursement rates in the MEDA aid programme (down to just 
26%) were caused by complicated procedures in both the EU and Mediterranean 
partners, and failure of the southern partner countries to make appropriate social 
and economic reforms, including joining the World Trade Organization. The 
reforms envisioned by the Commission to address these problems included 
making aid disbursements more conditional upon economic reforms in the partner 
countries and retreating from regional programmes to sub-regional and country-
based aid (European Commission 2000).  
The economic effects of the free trade area in industrial goods between the EU 
and each non-member Mediterranean country (NMMC) which the Barcelona 
Process aims to establish by 2010 are far from certain. The centre and periphery 
(or hub and spoke) configuration (Tovias l999) of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements between each Mediterranean country and the EU might 
have the effect of increasing the NMMCs' dependence on the EU. The oft-cited 
prediction that through the introduction of free trade in the Mediterranean basin 
one-third of NMMCs' industry will be lost; one-third damaged and one-third thrive seems to be a ball-park guess rather than a careful projection (cf Lister l997; 
Joffe￿' l999). The EU's refusal to include agriculture or services in the free trade 
area, but to treat them only as subjects for gradual 'liberalisation' also suggests 
that the balance of benefits in the partnership is more heavily weighted in favour 
of the European side. Discussions on agricultural trade began in January 2000, 
but results are not expected until 2005 (Joffe￿' 2000).  
The Nair Report to the European Parliament, adopted in 2001, noted the 
continuing attachment of the signatories to the Barcelona process, while seriously 
criticizing the lack of progress in almost all aspects of its performance and 
implementation, from strategic vision to aid management and the environment. 
The Report objected to the priority given to northern, central and eastern 
European candidate members of the EU and called for comparable technical 
assistance to be given to the Mediterranean NMMCs in reducing external debt and 
harmonizing investment laws. In institutional terms, the Nair Report proposed 
future development of the partnership and the political dialogue, including 
implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum, adopting the Euro-
Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability and moving towards a new, more 
integrated association of Euro-Mediterranean states. In economic terms the 
Report decried the budget of 5.35 bn euros for 2000-2006 as inadequate, called 
for harmonizing the rules of origin, increasing South-South trade and monitoring 
the implementation of the proposed Euro-Mediterranean free trade area with 
regard to its social and environmental consequences.  
The issue of migration was specifically highlighted, with the objective of moving 
towards joint management of migration in both host and sending countries (Nair 
2001). The Report further argued that public awareness of the Partnership should 
be raised, and the small programmes for decentralised cooperation with civil 
society which the EU suspended in l995 -Med-Urbs, Med-Campus and Med-Media 
- should not be discontinued but revived. Despite the substantial sums of aid 
invested by the EU,,434.5 m euros for l995-99 in grants and 3,900 m in loans, 
the implementation and effectiveness of the Mediterranean aid programme 
(MEDA) has been widely criticised. The vast number of budget lines and aid 
instruments - from humanitarian aid to loans and risk capital - means that 
coordination is a problem. Aid management resided in different directorates of the 
Commission and in the semi-independent Common Service for External Relations. 
The backlog of unspent funds from allocations dating back to l978 also 
complicated the situation (COWI l998, x).  
Reforms of the European aid programme in 2000 included geographical 
consolidation, with the Mediterranean region listed under Section B of the new 
Europe Aid Cooperation Office.  
In per capita terms in l996, EU aid to the Mediterranean at 1.4 US dollars is far 
more generous than the 0.7 dollars allocated to the low income and least 
developed countries, but substantially less than the 4.5 dollars accorded to 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR (DFID 1998, 11). Recent 
changes link the disbursement of aid funds more closely to project performance. 
Lack of aid evaluation reports, lack of public information activities in the EU, and 
over centralised management of aid contributed to the perception in many 
quarters that MEDA aid had serious problems. 
To examine the case of gender in a little more detail, non-discrimination on the 
basis of sex is included as a part of human in the political and security basket and 
"the key role of women in development" is briefly mentioned under "Economic 
cooperation" (and just above fish). But within the social, cultural and human affairs section references to gender are conspicuously lacking (Barcelona l997). 
Neither the Commission's 'Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process' document nor 
the Nair Report give more than the sketchiest reference to improving women's 
conditions or other gender-related objectives. This suggests that gender -along 
with other social issues - has not achieved mainstream importance in the two 
sides' conceptualisation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
The Euro-Mediterranean project, the most ambitious in the modern history of the 
Mediterranean region, is based on an uneasy between the northern and southern 
EU member states; and between the EU and the NMMCs (Calabrese l997). 
Another for the weakness of the Euro-Mediterranean links is the absence of a 
defined, credible, mutual threat (Lister l988, Calabrese l997). Without a definite 
external threat to both shores of the Mediterranean, Euro-Mediterranean 
solidarity won't take its place at the very top of EU concerns. Fears of 
immigration into the EU from the NMMCs, fears of the Islamic terrorism which 
rocked France in l994 or of the Arab-Israeli conflict have not risen to the status of 
the perceived threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, although the 
September 2001 attack on New York could change this. 
Regardless of its potential, the vitality of the Barcelona pact remains in doubt. 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership's high profile in l995 may have raised 
expectations of its accomplishments to unsustainable heights. One of the reasons 
for the longevity of the EU's relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries through successive Yaounde' and Lome' Conventions dating back to 
l963 was their low political profile and appearance of political neutrality. This has 
led the EU-ACP relationship to be described as 'the discreet entente' (Lister l988). 
By contrast, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has suffered from high-level 
political problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Algerian civil war. The 
nature of the integrated Barcelona package meant that conflicts over an area like 
human rights or arms proliferation might spill over into others like trade or aid 
(COWI l998). 
On the political level, the well known frailty of the EU's common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) contributed to the weakness of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. A former Greek minister summarised the problem: "The Barcelona 
process is based on the CFSP, but experience thus far has not shown that there is 
a CFSP." (Philip Morris Institute l998, 9). Brauch, Marquina and Bihad (2000) 
argued that the re-emergence of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the late l990s 
eclipsed all the regional Mediterranean negotiations in the context of the 
Barcelona process. Other inter-regional dialogues between the southern 
Mediterranean states and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), NATO and the Western European Union have not fulfilled all regional 
political needs (Brauch, Marquina, Bihad 2000). The failure to integrate the 
southern Mediterranean countries as full members of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or to create a parallel Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean still leaves an institutional deficit. 
But at least part of the reason for the indifferent performance of the Barcelona 
process (including the follow-up ministerial meetings in Malta in l997 , Palermo in 
l998, Stuttgart in l999 and Lisbon in 2000) lies in the EU's lack of a vigorous 
commitment to it. Returning to the theme of declaratory policy-making discussed 
earlier, the European Council of Development Ministers from l981-95 approved 
some 66 separate resolutions covering issue areas such as relations with non-
governmental organizations (ngos), poverty, gender, and environment. However, 
these were never prioritised or codified into an accomplishable package. (COWI 
l998, ix).    
III. Partnership: an elusive goal 
The meaning of partnerships between sovereign states has recently been an 
academic subject of discussion (Lister l988; Maxwell and Riddell l998)). In the 
case of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, investigating the idea of partnership 
evokes a number of conceptual issues relating to participation and equality. 
Despite the difficulty of pinning down a precise political meaning of 'partnership', 
the usage of this terminology is widespread. 'Partnership' has flourished in EU 
jargon ever since it replaced "Association" as the EU's epithet for its relations with 
developing countries in the first Lome' Convention of l975.  
In the Euro-Mediterranean agreement, it is not surprising that 'partnership' 
emerges as a term which is vague rather than precisely defined. On one hand, 
the Commission found that 'a new spirit of partnership has been built between 
the EU and its Mediterranean partners" (European Commission 2000). But on the 
other hand this spirit of partnership was insufficiently frank in political dialogue on 
human rights, terrorism and migration. Furthermore, as noted above, the 
southern partners were insufficiently rapid in their negotiations and ratification of 
the foundational agreements, and insufficiently fast in their economic reforms. 
Moreover, the Barcelona process was little known to society at large (a 
partnership thus limited to state and supranational levels of actors). 
Nevertheless, the EU wanted to have a partnership where all of the signatories 
would participate in the process at some level, and work towards common goals. 
The EU wanted to offer the Mediterranean countries more than the a take it or 
leave it package of previous EU-Mediterranean policies (European Commission 
2000).  
At present the word 'partnership' can be (and often is ) applied to almost any 
interstate relations - from the close links between EU partner states, the relations 
between Europe and the US in NATO, to the US plans for partnerships with poor 
countries. In fact, offering aid on a 'take it or leave it' basis was a charge more 
often associated with the Lome￿' Conventions than with the EU's Mediterranean 
policies.  
In Africa under the US Trade and Development Act 2000. Nato's Partnership for 
Peace with formerly socialist central and eastern European countries has two 
opposing interpretations: one, that the scheme is a stepping stone or halfway 
house for full Nato membership; the other that it is an alternative or substitute 
for full Nato membership (Hoffmann l998). The term 'asymmetrical' has rightly 
sometimes been added to partnership to indicate its unequal nature (Ravenhill 
l981). Even more graphic is the description of partnership as stemming from the 
model the 'partnership' of the horse and its rider (Lister l988). In any case, 
relations of equality seem much rarer in the contemporary interstate partnership 
arena than those of inequality. Politics has even been defined, not only as the 
science of government or the authoritative allocation of values in a political 
system, but as the permanent redistribution of inequalities among and within 
states (Hoffmann l998). While the EU's system of development policies - including 
the Lome' Convention (now Cotonou Agreement) and the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership- aim at reducing rather than just managing or redistributing 
inequalities, they have had limited success so far in this goal (Lister l997; 
European Commission l997b). 
In spite of the vagueness of the term 'partnership' and the difficulty of defining it 
exactly (Maxwell and Riddell l998), it does express for many people an ideal of equality, equity, and harmonious cooperation. This ideal, for example in the case 
of the Lome￿' Convention, is "known by everybody never to have existed but to 
be necessary to create" (Sebegnou l999). To borrow marketing's terminology, 
partnership could be called 'aspirational'. 
In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the rhetoric and the ideal of 
partnership can be juxtaposed against the problems of inequality between the 
wealthy and powerful EU states and the poor countries of the southern 
Mediterranean littoral. Instead of partnership, the basic power configuration in 
the region is one of European domination or hegemony with Europe at the centre 
or hub of the system and the outlying Mediterranean countries as the periphery 
or spokes (Joffe￿' l997; Joffe￿' l999). 
Francis Fukuyama emphasised the importance of trust in building social capital 
and promoting economic development (Fukuyama l995). Such an argument could 
be future extended beyond national societies and to international relationships as 
regimes of trust or at least regimes based on predictable and consistent patterns 
of state behaviour (Lister l997), for example between the EU and USA or between 
EU member states. To expand Fukuyama's model beyond its domestic basis, 
under conditions of international trust, for instance around the Mediterranean 
basin, economic prosperity would be a more likely outcome.  
Another possible alternative to the over-used and underdefined term 
'partnership', which incorporates the importance of a sense of trust was 
expressed by the Czech Republic's President Havel. He employed 'solidarity' 
rather than 'partnership' in his description of the reasons for NATO's fifty years of 
success. For Havel the key to NATO's longevity was not just the self-interest of 
the states concerned, not a mere market or trade relationship, but a special type 
of human culture and civilisation. Nato was "a commonwealth-in-solidarity of 
those sharing common values, with its principles of openness and solidarity being 
implied by the very nature of these values." (Havel l999) Although NATO 
expanded its membership in l999 to accept Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic, it is not yet a commonwealth-in-solidarity of every country that wishes 
to join.  
It would be hard to find a better case than the two shores of the Mediterranean to 
illustrate thousands of years of shared culture and civilisation (Braudel l972). But 
so far the realisation of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a commonwealth-in 
solidarity, or a partnership in more than name, is still in process. 
IV. The Developing Countries - up and down on Europe's agenda  
The EU's Forward Studies Unit's strategy paper on the future of North-South 
relations recognized the EU's long-term problem of inward orientation or self-
absorption. But among its external priorities, the EU's two main areas of interest 
were Central and Eastern Europe, followed and North Africa and the Middle East. 
Along with these regional interests, global level political and economic concerns 
were also important (European Commission l998). The same document 
mentioned the Lome￿' Convention with sub-Saharan Africa the Caribbean and 
Pacific very critically, citing a need for fundamental reforms. It referred to the 
lack of new ideas in development thinking and the problems of poor governance 
in developing countries, but was less forthcoming regarding the EU's 
responsibility towards developing countries or the changeability of its interests 
(Commission l998). Faber and Roelfsema argued that there were three main 
reasons for the EU's declining interest in the Lome￿' agreements with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. These were: the shift of interest towards eastern Europe and North Africa along with the fading of Europeans' 
sense of colonial responsibility; the downward pressure on the member states' aid 
budgets; and doubts about the effectiveness of the Lome￿' Conventions in 
achieving development objectives (Faber and Roelfsema l997).  
A similar downward slide in EU interest in the southern Mediterranean was noted 
by a former director for the Mediterranean, Near and Middle East division in the 
European Commission. Eberhard Rhein argued that the EU had never given the 
Middle East its due importance. Furthermore, it was only shortly after the signing 
of the Barcelona Declaration of l995 that the EU's priorities were already shifting 
away from the Mediterranean basin and towards other issues such as economic 
and monetary union, internal Community reform, Nato's eastern enlargement, 
and unemployment within the EU (Rhein l997). The Mediterranean issue was 'off 
the boil' for Europe almost as soon as it was on.  
Moreover, the backdrop of the end of the Cold War meant that the countries of 
the South lost much of their strategic importance. Increasing Eurocentrism 
caused the EU to devote less interest in the Mediterranean region. Indeed, 
regional crises the Mediterranean had become so insignificant that they 'may not 
demand immediate attention' (Pinar Tank l998).  
The Finnish Presidency of the EU in the latter half of l999 made the renegotiation 
of the Lome￿' Convention, grandly styled by Finland's Minister for Development 
Cooperation as 'one of the finest and most extensive instruments of North-South 
cooperation in the world" (Hassi l999) one of its top priorities - but did not give 
comparable importance to the Mediterranean region. In the rapidly changing field 
of European development interests, the Mediterranean region, in the second half 
of the l990s, lost out.  
The renegotiation of the Lome￿' Convention, begun in late l998, and signed in 
June 2000 as the Cotonou Agreement, shifted the Union's interest more towards 
its traditional sphere of influence in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific. The 
Cotonou Agreement has been remade to a large extent in Europe's desired 
mould, creating free trade areas, eliminating or reducing the Convention's special 
commodity protocols and its STABEX export support scheme, while increasing 
conditionality on aid funds. This process rekindled EU development interest in the 
ACP, at least for the negotiations period.  
Furthermore, in the l990s, Europe has been heavily challenged by the ongoing 
civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, and is addressing this issue through 
'development track' diplomacy. That is, traditional development aid is being 
increasingly conceptualised in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of conflict prevention, 
post-conflict reconstruction, civil-military cooperation and overall sustainable 
peace-building (Lister l999a). Whether the new emphasis on peace-building in aid 
relationships like the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement will have significant results, is 
not yet clear.  
It might appear that parts of northern Europe , occupied by other concerns, are 
almost experiencing a period of Euro-Mediterranean amnesia. It is worth noting 
that in late 1999 as Europe grappled increasingly with conflict issues in its post-
Lome￿' policy, some of the longstanding conflicts of North Africa - between the 
West and Libya, and in the Algerian civil war - were gradually being settled, 
making the region a more fruitful area for EU cooperation or at least for a happier 
coexistence (Wright l992; Khalaf and Huband l999).  For the developing world, the EU's inward orientation and its waxing and waning 
of interest in different regions have had a destabilizing impact. Combined with 
concerns over the effectiveness problems of its development aid and trade 
regimes (Lister l997), this has created uncertainty among its developing partners 
about the seriousness of the EU's commitment to them. And, as the next section 
shows, the EU's policy-making process has contributed to uncertain or 
unpredictable outcomes in development policy. 
  
V. EU Development Policies and Hot Air 
The EU has often been called a political dwarf or even a 'semi-power' (Hoffmann 
l998) and its policies towards developing countries seem like ineffective semi-
policies. Many studies of EU policy-making have focused on intra-European issues 
rather than international policies (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Organski l994 ). 
The main point of agreement among analysts of EU policy-making is that the 
intricacy of EU institutions, the difficulty of assessing extra-institutional factors, 
(Bueno de Mesquita l994) and even the secrecy of EU processes make policy 
analysis and prediction extremely difficult.  
The EU's inbuilt tensions between national sovereignty and common policy, the 
complexity and diversity of its policy-making processes (W. Wallace l995; Cram 
l997), the problems of its institutional structure militate against clear and stable 
policies. William Wallace's description of how national policies have been 
coordinated and common EU policies "have emerged over extended periods from 
successive partial bargains, compromises, incremental drift, and responses to 
external demand over extended periods" (W. Wallace l996, 440) implies that less 
than clear and coherent policies will normally emerge. Theorists of EU policy-
making vie in their attempts to depict the 'unpredictable and multi-level policy- 
making environment' (Richardson l996a, 4) of the EU, with its complex of 
Community, Union and 'negotiated order' policy-making systems (Smith l996), 
and the need for not one, but a portfolio of linked theoretical models (Peterson 
and Bomberg l999) to deal with the EU case.  
Development policies are further complicated by the uneven mixture of donor 
interests and recipient needs in the policy process (Olsen l998; Hughes l999). 
Richardson identified a common perception that EU policies often seemed to come 
from nowhere (Richardson l996a , 17). In the case of development policy this is 
almost inconceivable: policies come inter alias from the member states' 
longstanding interests, the policies of the international donor community 
(nowadays led by the so-called Washington Consensus of the World Bank and 
IMF), other international development institutions such as UNCTAD or UNICEF, 
national governments and non-governmental organizations (ngos). In the 
Mediterranean region, contemporary EU policies emerge not only from the 
immediate regional policy vacuum left by the end of the Cold War, but also from 
thousands of years' of contact, and sometimes conflict, between the northern and 
southern shores. Another assumption which has little to offer an analysis of 
development policy is the idea that we should try to understand the EU 'as a 
policy-making state' (Richardson l996a, 11). This rather odd conception seems to 
ignore all the previously-mentioned complexity of the EU decision-making 
system. In harking back to a simpler (nation state) model , the intention is to 
emphasise the low politics or technical nature of much EU activity and de-
emphasise its 'high politics' content. Such a view has little to offer an analysis of 
EU development policy in the Mediterranean basin- where the national interests 
and foreign policies of the southern European member countries, such as France, Italy, Greece and Spain, and the foreign policy actor image of the EU play a 
central role. As Braudel's classic study of the Mediterranean region observed, 
Mediterranean influence travelled north on a few limited routes. The zone of 
Mediterranean culture and influence was concentrated near the shores of the sea 
(Braudel l972). The Nair Report (2001) went as far as to argue that Euro-
Mediterranean relations should be restructured to take account of the greater 
commitment of some EU members to the relationship than others; with some 
Mediterranean projects involving only the more committed EU states (Nair 2001).  
Today, the complexity of contemporary EU policy-making extends further into the 
sub-national level. For instance, in the Mediterranean region the interests of the 
southern member states mentioned above in supporting an active EU policy may 
directly conflict with the lobbying of their own farmers against free trade in 
Mediterranean agricultural products (Hakura l999). 
EU policy-making can be classified into 4 broad types (Lowi l972, W. Wallace 
l996). The first, involving constituent policies, concerns what could be called basic 
or constitutional issues about the rules of the game. The second type are 
redistributive issues in which broad political coalitions, or parties, dispute the 
allocation of benefits. In the third type, distributive issues involve smaller sectoral 
interests and their internations with policy-makers. Finally, regulatory issues 
focus on legal or semi-legal processes. Lowi noted the surprising complexity and 
variation of the US cases of policy-making he examined, and the difficulty of 
making meaningful generalizations (Lowi l972). He was especially concerned 
about the category of distributive policies - an area where EU policies have been 
particularly important - because 'nothing open and democratic can come of them' 
(Lowi l972, 308). 
In the EU example, constituent issues involve the treaties or core priorities; 
redistributive issues pit governments against each other in important matters; 
distributive issues affect particular sectors such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy; and regulatory issues concern expert committees, epistemic communities 
or even the European Court of Justice (W. Wallace l996). However, the common 
foreign and security policy of the EU, and its associated development policy 
(Lister l997) fail to fit neatly into any of these categories. 
When France made the association of its colonies to the European Community a 
￿sine qua non￿ of Community membership, development policy was a 
constituent issue. In other cases, such as the negotiation of the Barcelona 
Declaration in l995 or successive renegotiations of the Lome￿' Conventions, 
development policy might be characterised as a redistributive or even distributive 
issue. The subject of the EU's special banana import regime for the ACP countries 
or the execution of its aid programme might be categorised as regulatory. The 
desire of the EU to promote democracy in developing countries (Commission 
l997a) would be better described as an ideological policy (cf. Van Den Bos l994a). 
In another example, the Union's wish to be more present and visible globally 
(European Commission l997a) doesn't fall clearly into any of Lowi's four 
categories. One of the main aims of the EU in the Mediterranean region, through 
the Barcelona process, is to upgrade the role of the EU throughout the region to 
the status of a major actor (Calabrese l997) - even an equal of the United States.  
As discussed below, the EU has another category of policy-making, the category 
of declaratory policies - or hot air.  
The EU shares some of the characteristics of large corporations which develop 
ambitious mission statements, high social and cultural aspirations, and then fail to implement them. International conferences which set development targets on 
reducing hunger or illiteracy , ban discrimination against women or protect the 
environment also often fail to have their decisions fully implemented (Lister 
l999b, 1 ).  
The problem of policy implementation is not new. Pressman and Wildavsky 
argued in l973 that it wasn't a surprise when public policies didn't work; it was a 
surprise when they did (Richardson l996b, 279). But leaving aside such caveats, 
it is true that the EU suffers more than many European national governments 
from the perception that its policies are largely mere rhetoric. Richardson 
identified the issue areas of the environment and women's rights as being among 
those where policy implementation is particularly ineffective (Richardson l996b). 
In the development field, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
implementing the often vague objectives of the Commission and Member States, 
without excessive bureaucratic procedures and delays, is a major problem. Chris 
Patten, former UK minister for overseas development, and now European 
Commissioner for external relations, testified to the European Parliament's 
Committee on external relations in September l999. He promised to stop the EU's 
tendency to produce unfulfilled initiatives and 'hot air', and to try to make the 
common foreign and security policy a reality. In a slightly outdated phrase for the 
post-BSE era, Mr. Patten argued the Commission should 'deliver the beef' rather 
than devising grandiose projects which were never implemented. He condemned 
the 'cynical' backlog of E18bn of unspent funds covering 14,500 projects. Nearly 
one-third of these poorly performing projects were over five years old (Norman 
l999).  
In summary, traditional studies of EU policy-making have largely focused on 
internal issues. They have uncovered complexity and diversity in domestic EU 
policy processes, but development policy's additional political and historical 
dimensions, make it difficult to fit into categories such as those designed by Lowi. 
The implementation of development policy, ideally incorporating inputs from 
developing countries, represents a still greater level of complexity or challenge for 
the EU's policymaking process.  
VI Conclusion  
This article has investigated the Euro-Mediterranean partnership established in 
Barcelona in l995 and found a policy largely sidelined by events beyond its 
control. By 2000 the European Commission recognized the need to reinvigorate a 
faltering process. Although Kwarteng's (l997) assessment that the EU had never 
undertaken any initiative to address the underlying concerns and vulnerability of 
Africa seems over-harsh in the Euro-Mediterranean context, the implementation 
of the partnership has attracted numerous criticisms. The European Parliament’s 
Nair Report of 2001 condemned many aspects of an unconvincing partnership 
based on narrow European self-interest. It declared: "The grand vision of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership which was inaugurated in Barcelona in November 
l995 has now given way to a negotiating process which lacks any genuine 
strategic perspective. It as though Europe is interested in the Mediterranean 
solely for security reasons.... and conceives its economic involvement solely as a 
means of opening up the markets of the countries of the South.' (Nair 2001)  
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership's political dialogue was overshadowed by the 
Middle East peace process, its economic reforms and aid disbursements were 
slow and controversial, and its impact on civil society was minimal. The imbalance 
of power in the relationship, with the EU setting the standards and limits, meant that the ambitious process of cooperation among 27 signatories begun in 
Barcelona in l995 could be termed a partnership in name only. 
The EU's tendency to prioritize internal over external events, its lack of a credible 
foreign policy and its tendency to lose interest in its development policies also 
adversely affected the first five years of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. The 
complexity of policy-making in the European Union has provided a rich source of 
material for academic analysts. But most of their analysis is based on internal EU 
policies. Even the complexity and uncertainties found by policy analysts like Van 
den Bos and Richardson in internal EU policymaking are dwarfed by the additional 
complexity of development policy. In the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, for 
instance, policymaking incorporates the international norms of the Washington 
consensus on development, the contemporary needs and the historical linkages of 
the signatory states, and the limitations of the European Union's political process.  
In conclusion, it is hard to avoid seeing the considerable potential of Barcelona 
process as still unfulfilled. From an historical perspective, as Pierros, Meunier and 
Abrams (l999) observed, although the past forty years of EU efforts to develop an 
effective Mediterranean policy have not yet succeeded, in the longer term results 
may be more positive. Much remains to be done to establish the credibility of the 
partnership and fulfil the ambitions of the signatories to establish a stable zone of 
peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. As the European Commission's 
￿Agenda 2000￿ document argued "Active measures will have to be taken to 
reinforce links between the Union and its Mediterranean Partners. The stable 
development of the southern Mediterranean rim is a challenge of ever increasing 
proportions" (European Commission, l997a, 35). There is no doubt that the 
European Commission and the southern EU member states recognize the 
challenge of the Mediterranean region: the doubt remains about whether the 
challenge can be met. 
  
Footnotes 
1.    The EU has partly stepped into this gap with anti-terrorist aid to the 
Palestinian Authority under the common foreign and security policy (Council Joint 
Action, 13 April 2000) and by joining the US, Japan and Norway in propping up 
the Palestinian Authority after the withdrawal of Israeli funding (Taylor, S. (2001) 
"EU ministers to tackle Palestinian funding" European Voice, vol. 7 , no. 7, 15-21 
February).  
2.     The signatory countries of the Barcelona Declaration are: Algeria, Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Spain, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, the 
Netherlands, the UK, Syria, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority - 
also the EU Council of Ministers and Commission. 
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